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LIMITED LIABILITY AND EXTERNALIZATION
OF RISK:
A COMMENT ON THE DEATH OF
PARTNERSHIP
ROBERT W. HILLMAN*
Professor Ribstein believes the advent and spread of limited liability
companies (LLCs) will undermine the partnership form of organization.1
On a normative level, he views this development as desirable because he
believes that limited liability possibly is efficient and, accordingly, part-
nership possibly is inefficient. The qualifiers assume considerable signifi-
cance because in an earlier draft of his paper, presented at the F. Hodge
O'Neal Conference on Corporate Law and Finance, Ribstein confidently
and unqualifiedly asserted the efficiency of limited liability and ineffi-
ciency of the partnership form of organization.2 Now, however, Ribstein
offers a highly ambiguous and tentative brief for the efficiency of limited
liability. Perhaps in the fullness of time Ribstein will abandon his en-
dorsement of limited liability. But that is unlikely, and the task at hand
is to consider the arguments Ribstein presently offers to support his belief
that the normative case for limited liability may be greatly exaggerated.
My Comment focuses on Ribstein's argument that the potential for
externalities caused by limited liability "may be less than has been sup-
posed." 3 In one sense, the artful way he puts his proposition is a consid-
erable improvement over his original, more categorical statement that
"the potential for externalities is insufficient to justify restricting the
availability of limited liability."'4 But in another sense, Ribstein's attempt
to salvage his position comes at the expense of introducing an uncer-
tainty over what that position is. To say that a problem "may be less
than has been supposed" is to offer the reader nothing. The problem may
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
1. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
70 WAsH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992).
2. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
Paper Presented at F. Hodge O'Neal Conference on Corporate Law and Finance, Washington Uni-
versity (Nov. 9, 1991) (copy on file with the author).
3. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 439.
4. Ribstein, supra note 2.
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still be serious, though less so than originally supposed, or the problem
may be trivial, or the problem may be something else altogether. Since
the balance of his analysis argues that "protecting tort creditors does not
justify restricting the development of LLCs," the reader can only as-
sume that Ribstein believes that the externalities attendant to limited lia-
bility are not serious. If this is what Ribstein means, and if he is correct
on this point (and I do not believe he is), he has made a large part of the
case for the desirability of limited liability.
I. LIMITED LIABILITY, CAPITALIZATION AND INSURANCE
Professor Ribstein offers three reasons owners may have an incentive
to capitalize adequately and insure under a regime of limited liability: (1)
owners of closely held firms will have an incentive to insure against per-
sonal tort liabilities arising from their participation in firm activities; (2)
owners will have an incentive to insure to protect their investments in
firms from claims of tort creditors of the firms; and (3) certain creditors
will have the incentive and the leverage to insist on adequate capitaliza-
tion and/or insurance of the firms with which they do business. Here
again, Ribstein qualifies his conclusions by observing that his "goal [is]
only to show that externalization is not as serious a problem as has been
supposed." 6 Unfortunately, he does not attempt to define how serious
the problem is, or if it is serious at all; but, since he does assert that
externalization problems "often do not exist, even in many very closely
held limited liability firms,"7 we may assume that Ribstein believes lim-
ited liability does not give rise to significant externalization problems. If
this is not his view, there hardly would have been a reason for Ribstein to
include the discussion of externalization in his article.
None of the reasons Ribstein offers adequately addresses the potential
for externalization of business risks. To a significant extent, Ribstein's
arguments on externalization are weakened by his tendency to talk some-
times about closely held firms,8 sometimes about publicly held firms,
sometimes about both, and sometimes without identifying the type of
5. Id.
6. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 440 n.101.
7. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
8. Ribstein adds further ambiguity by occasionally referring to "very close corporations," a
potentially important concept, but one he does not adequately explain or integrate into his analysis.
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firm to which he is referring.9 Ribstein's analysis is at times unitary and
at times quasi-unitary, l° but at most times it fails to accommodate the
diversity of firms about which he is writing and thus renders his article
an interesting but flawed brief for limited liability. The deficiencies in
Ribstein's analysis become apparent on a closer examination of the rea-
sons he dismisses the externalization consequences of limited liability.
A. Insurance against personal tort liability
Consider first the idea that owners will insure against their own tort
liability. Here, Ribstein is referring to only closely held firms and profes-
sional associations. His argument is brief and may be quoted nearly in
full:
Limited liability does not insulate tortfeasors themselves from liability, but
merely prevents liability solely by virtue of ownership status. In the most
closely held firms, where undercapitalization is the greatest problem, owners
may have sufficiently participated in the tort, either as, direct actors or as
negligent monitors to be held directly liable.11
Hence, Ribstein believes, owners have a significant incentive to insure
against tort liability.
It is not clear what Ribstein means when he says "owners may have
sufficiently participated in the tort ... to be liable." Presumably Ribstein
is saying that, at least in the context of closely held firms, owners are
generally liable for tort obligations of employees and firms; 2 to say
something less would not advance the position he seems to embrace. Yet
we know from reported litigation that owners can and do isolate them-
selves from the tort liabilities of their employees and firms. Indeed, many
of the piercing-the-corporate-veil cases-including chestnuts of the class-
room like Walkovszky v. Carlton,"3 the taxicab case-illustrate the use-
fulness of incorporation in protecting owners from the tort liabilities of
their employees or their firms. 4 Ribstein's implication that the threat of
9. Moreover, closely held firms differ as much from each other as they do from publicly held
firms. See infra text accompanying note 32.
10. By quasi-unitary I mean an analysis that ostensibly recognizes the existence of both closely
held and publicly held firms but fails adequately to address the distinctions between the two types of
firms.
11. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 440-41 (emphasis added).
12. This is identical to his original position. See Ribstein, supra note 2.
13. 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
14. See generally Robert Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
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tort liability for owners is substantial, and that therefore owners have an
incentive to insure, is thus a dangerous generalization desperately in need
of explanation and documentation. Such an unsubstantiated conclusion
is either an empirically based declaration, a broad doctrinal assertion, or,
perhaps, both. In any event, the burden is on Ribstein to produce evi-
dence supportive of the point that owners generally are liable for the
torts of firm employees, if that is what he means. Given the tremendous
variety of closely held firms and levels of owner participation, I doubt
that he can do this. If he cannot, his normative conclusions on limited
liability are unwarranted.
B. Voluntary Creditors as Monitor/Demanders of Insurance or
Capitalization
Next, and I am taking his points slightly out of order, Professor Rib-
stein observes that voluntary creditors of limited liability firms will insist
on adequate insurance and capitalization.15 As to which voluntary credi-
tors will make such demands, Ribstein, borrowing from Frank H. Easter-
brook and Daniel R. Fischel, 6 first points to long-term creditors, such as
managers and employees, who would be hurt by a forced liquidation of
the firm's assets. He observes, "Because these voluntary creditors can
adjust their terms to reflect the firm's exposure to tort risks, the firm has
the incentive to insure and capitalize adequately to cover expected tort
claims." 17
Easterbrook and Fischel were writing about public corporations. Rib-
stein is not so limiting in his analysis and in fact fails to make any dis-
tinction at this point between closely held and publicly held firms. It is
an exceedingly difficult challenge-perhaps an impossible one-to ad-
dress limited liability with a unitary analysis that fails to distinguish pub-
lie from closely held firms.18 It is therefore unsurprising that his analysis
of this point is unconvincing when applied to the closely held firm. At
least where the owners are also the managers, they may or may not have
the incentive to insure in order to avoid the forced liquidation of the
assets of the firm. And in circumstances in which the assets of the firm
are significantly less than foreseeable liabilities, the cost of fully insuring
15. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 442.
16. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 89, 104-07 (1985).
17. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 441-42.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 25-31.
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liabilities may significantly exceed the benefits to owner managers seek-
ing to avoid a forced liquidation.
Moving on to employees who are neither managers nor owners, it may
seem sensible as a matter of economic reasoning to assume that, when
risk to employees is present because of inadequate capitalization or un-
derinsurance, they will bargain for compensation appropriate to the level
of risk they bear.19 However sensible this proposition may seem in the
abstract, it does not comport with reality. We have seen, for example, a
number of instances in recent years where large, financially distressed
corporations have used their own shaky capitalizations and faltering eco-
nomic performances as a means of demanding wage concessions and
give-backs of employee benefits. To cite just one of countless examples,
Compaq Computer recently responded to a massive third-quarter loss
with an announcement that it would slash prices, layoff fourteen hundred
employees (twelve percent of its workforce), and seek concessions from
"suppliers," an ominous term to all who may be affected.2" This hardly
seems an appropriate time for the remaining employees of Compaq-or
any other company similarly situated-to demand additional compensa-
tion or increased capitalization of their employer. And if the idea that
employees monitor the wealth of public firms to insure the adequacy of
capitalization and insurance seems stretched, it seems even less plausible
in the context of closely held firms, at least in periods of labor surpluses.
Ribstein may be on somewhat firmer ground with respect to creditors
who are not employees or managers. Banks, for example, regularly in-
clude casualty insurance covenants in their loan agreements, particularly
when the lending is for the purpose of asset acquisition. Depending on
the designation of loss payees, however, such covenants may or may not
run to the benefit of the parties who did not negotiate them. The prob-
lem is not dissimilar to that raised by secured creditors. The availability
of firm assets as security for credit may enhance the creditworthiness of
the firm, a development that only sometimes will benefit the firm's other
claimants. Upon default, however, the security runs exclusively to the
benefit of the protected creditor: Although the possible elimination of
that creditor reduces the total claims on firm assets, the remaining claim-
19. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 104 ("Employees, consumers, trade creditors,
and lenders are voluntary creditors. The compensation they demand will be a function of the risk
they face.").
20. See Jim Bartimo, Compaq Posts First Net Loss on Big Charge, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1991,
at B4.
1992]
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ants are left with a much smaller pool of assets over which their claims
extend.
Ribstein points to unsophisticated voluntary creditors such as consum-
ers seeking compensation at rates in excess of risk, which prompts firms
capable of doing so to signal or bond their solvency and coverage of tort
risks. Again, Ribstein makes the point with sufficient generality to make
critical analysis difficult. It may be that financially distressed large cor-
porations such as airlines are forced-by virtue of publicity over bank-
ruptcy prospects-to discount prices to secure consumers. I will assume
that it is true even though there are reasons to think it might not be. The
important point is that the financial problems of these corporations are
well publicized and information is costless, or nearly so. The financial
distresses of smaller firms, on the other hand, typically are neither publi-
cized nor reflected in the pricing of their products and services.
Finally, Ribstein fails even to acknowledge the existence of creditors
who offer their products and services on uniform terms to all customers.
Although the pricing or credit terms of these trade creditors may reflect
the aggregate credit risk of all their customers, individual customers typi-
cally will be unable to secure lower prices or cheaper credit through the
type of signalling and bonding Ribstein describes. To a significant de-
gree, such creditors are involuntary creditors in a position similar to that
of tort victims.
C. Insurance and Capitalization for the Purpose of Protecting the
Investments of Owners
Professor Ribstein's third argument that firms will be adequately capi-
talized or insured is that owners will desire to protect their investments
in their firms from third-party claims. It is true, of course, that owners
with significant financial assets or human capital committed to firms will
often secure insurance to protect their investments. But this begs the
question because the problem of externalization likely is greatest in firms
without significant assets. In such firms, the incentive to insure must
come from sources other than the desire to protect assets or investments
that do not exist.
Admittedly, reasons other than risk aversion may explain the claimed
proclivities of firms to purchase insurance. For example, David Mayers
and Clifford Smith point to the comparative advantage of insurance firms
in the processing of claims and to the monitoring function of insurance
firms as a means of moderating the conflict of interest between owners
[Vol. 70:477
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and managers. 21 But in many closely held firms, the owners are the man-
agers, and it is doubtful that a comparative advantage in processing
claims is itself sufficient to prompt the purchase of substantial insurance
for firms without significant assets.22
II. RIBSTEIN'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO TRIVIALIZE THE
EXTERNALIZATION PROBLEM
Professor Ribstein concludes and summarizes his discussion of exter-
nalization and limited liability firms with the observation that underin-
surance and undercapitalization will be problems only for those firms
that do not have substantial assets, do not sell their products in markets
in which risks are efficiently priced, and have potentially large tort liabili-
ties.23 I would define a potentially large tort liability as a cost likely to be
externalized because of the inadequacy of the firm's wealth, but I pre-
sume Ribstein has something much larger in mind when he speaks of
liabilities. In any event, Ribstein believes that firms posing significant
externalization risks may be isolated into specific industries-his only ex-
ample is hazardous waste-and subjected to industry-specific insurance
or minimum-capital requirements. It is strange that Ribstein would offer
but one example in support of such a bold conclusion, and even as to
hazardous waste, the potential liabilities from hazardous substances,
materials, and waste are enormous. The problem is not limited to the
waste disposal industry, but includes a wide variety of manufacturing
companies ranging from the very large to the very small, from the closely
held to the publicly held.24 By sleight of hand, Ribstein assumes away
the significance of externalization risks and then uses the assumption to
prove his conclusion on limited liability. The world Ribstein is describ-
21. See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J.
Bus. 281, 285-86 (1982).
22. As support, Professor Ribstein cites David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corpo-
rate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, 63 J. Bus. 19 (1990), in which
the authors find that closely held insurance firms are more likely to purchase reinsurance than firms
whose shares are more widely held. The reinsurance industry, however, is in many respects unique,
and it is difficult to draw conclusions from that industry concerning tendencies of noninsurance firms
to purchase insurance. The authors, for example, note that reinsurance is a specialized form of
financing that may serve to relax regulatory constraints on the ratio of capital to insurance in force.
Id. at 23.
23. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 450. Here again, Ribstein may be speaking of the publicly held
firm, although he is not explicit on this point.
24. Perhaps these are liabilities that should, as a matter of policy, be externalized, but that is
not the point Ribstein is making.
1992]
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ing is not of this earth, and his analysis on the scope of the externaliza-
tion problem is therefore perhaps best relegated to the realm of science
fiction.
III. ARE CLOSELY HELD FIRMS DIFFERENT?
Professor Ribstein's failure adequately to distinguish between closely
and publicly held firms is apparent in his discussion of the costs of unlim-
ited liability. Here, he tells us that limited liability facilitates diversifica-
tion, delegation of decisionmaking to managers, reduction of monitoring
costs, and transferability of shares.25 These are essentially the justifica-
tions of Easterbrook and Fischel.26 But those commentators were speak-
ing of publicly held firms and organized securities markets, and they
pointedly, and for good reason, did not extend their conclusions to
closely held firms. 27 Perhaps Professor Ribstein and I simply have differ-
ent views of the characteristics of closely held firms; and in any event it is
clearly dangerous for either of us to generalize on the point.28 But at
least to the extent owners and managers are one in closely held firms and
their investments are, from the perspective of these individuals, substan-
tial, diversification is less of a priority (if it is one at all), monitoring is
more feasible than it is for the passive shareholder in the publicly held
firm, and transferability of shares is problematic because of the absence
of a functioning market for interests in closely held firms.
All of this takes me to my general conclusion on Ribstein's externali-
zation arguments. The case for limited liability of the public firm is
strong.29 The very interesting and more challenging issue, however, is
the value of limited liability for closely held firms. Much of Ribstein's
article fails to distinguish between the two types of enterprises and at-
tempts to bootstrap limited liability of closely held firms on that of pub-
licly held firms. But in truth, recognition of the distinctions between
closely and publicly held firms is essential.30
25. Ribstein, supra note 1, at 448.
26. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 93-97.
27. Id. at 109-10 (noting that less separation between management and risk bearing had
"profound implications for the role of limited liability").
28. See infra text accompanying note 32.
29. But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
30. This of course is not an original thought; others have offered the same observation. See,
e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 109-10; Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORoNTo L.J. 117, 148-49 (1980).
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The uniqueness of closely held firms is a point that Hodge O'Neal
made repeatedly. Indeed, it is his most important contribution. O'Neal's
orientation was doctrinal rather than economic, but he has had an enor-
mous influence on the way we look at closely held firms. Even Ribstein
has recognized that the activity of owner managers is an important factor
distinguishing closely held from publicly held firms." If limited liability
is to be the norm for all closely held firms, its justification likely lies in
reasons other than those applicable to publicly held firms. Ribstein has
made the case for limited liability in publicly held firms in which owners
are typically passive and not managers. But that case for limited liability
has already been made. As to the greater challenge of making the case
for limited liability in closely held firms, Ribstein's quasi-unitary analysis
misses the mark.
IV. BEYOND RIBSTEIN
I have criticized Professor Ribstein for inadequately taking into ac-
count the special characteristics of closely held firms. But the point on
the uniqueness of closely held firms is itself a dangerous generalization.
Closely held firms are diverse and include those firms in which all own-
ers are active, most owners are active, some owners are active, no owners
are active, some owners are active some of the time, and so on. More-
over, closely held firms are involved in every type of business activity, at
every scale. They range from the one-person coffee shop to the three-
person law firm to the five-hundred-person accounting firm to the ten-
person publishing operation to the husband-and-wife grocery store to
firms controlled by other firms. Such a complex array of firms may defy
treatment through simple economic models and unitary economic theo-
ries. At the very least, we need to know more about the firms of which
we write and consider the relevance of their diversity to the theories we
develop.
More empirical data are necessary to refine our general assumptions
and give meaning to our evaluations. Lacking that data, it is critical that
commentators state their assumptions and adjust for the variety of firms
in their analysis. Even more important is the need to consider carefully
what is meant by active participation in a firm. Consider just some of the
31. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 1.02, at 9 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the
close corporation by reference to "the corporate contract [that] combines partnership-type owner-
management with corporate-type limited liability").
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
486 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
possibilities. Active participation might mean power to control decision-
making, or actual control over decisionmaking, or acting as an agent of
the firm, or ability to monitor significant activities of agents for the firm,
or actual monitoring of agents' activities, or ability to direct activities of
the firm's agents, or actual direction of agents, or the appearance of all or
some of the above, and so forth.
Then, having developed a greater appreciation of the nuances of active
participation, it is necessary to consider how and why active involvement
with a firm may be relevant to the issue of limited liability. Again, con-
sider just a few of the possibilities:
Active participation reduces monitoring costs, and therefore the need for
limited liability, because shareholders are on the scene and may watch the
activities of their co-owners.
Active participation, when tied with a substantial investment, reduces the
need for limited liability because the shareholder may not have the same
diversification objectives as the passive investor in the publicly held firm.
Active participation may mislead third parties into thinking that
owner/managers stand behind the commitments of their firms.
Or, active participation justifies unlimited liability because the power to
control carries with it the responsibility for the consequences of the exercise
of control.
Once we achieve a greater understanding of the types of firms with which
we are dealing, the various roles that owners play, and the importance of
active participation to the question of limited liability, the relative effi-
ciencies of limited and unlimited liability may be addressed in a far more
sophisticated way than Ribstein's analysis permits.32
Finally, there are important public-choice issues that need more explo-
ration. Ribstein has offered an off-the-shelf theory. It is a theory in
search of an application, and it is likely that certain groups will find it
quite appealing. Consider in this regard the supposed reforms of limited-
partnership law that have relaxed restrictions on the control activities of
limited partners and at the same time preserved the principle of their
limited liability.33 Ribstein apparently does not view these developments
32. Limited liability may be efficient for a firm in which all or some investors are passive--one
that is similar to the classic limited partnership or the public corporation-while unlimited liability
is preferable to firms dominated by "active"-the ambiguity notwithstanding--owner/managers. In
any event, in many ways closely held firms are more complex and diverse than their public counter-
parts, and the limited liability regime developed for the public corporation may be poorly suited for
some, but not all, closely held firms.
33. Compare UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 7 (1916) (limited partner not liable to
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as dramatic, but he ignores the profound changes in limited-liability part-
nership law that have occurred over the last twenty years. Although
there is some academic support for the relaxation of control-activity re-
strictions, the changes have not been accompanied by a principled and
spirited exchange of views on the policy desirability of allowing increased
activity by limited partners. Instead, reform has been the product of the
pressure brought to bear by partnership syndicators and the professionals
who either represent them or are sensitive to their needs.3 4 And why?
Who speaks on the issue of limited liability for claimants of the firm such
as trade creditors, employees, and the like? Since limited liability is, in
the larger scheme of things, a relatively recent innovation, why has it
become such a persistent issue of law reform? Is it because of the eco-
nomic efficiencies it offers? At least as applied to closely held firms, those
benefits have not been established.
creditors unless partner takes part in the control of the business) with REV. UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303 (1976, as amended in 1985) (limited partner not liable to third parties
unless takes part in the control of the business and then only liable to those third parties who trans-
acted business with the partnership believing the partner was a general partner, with extensive activi-
ties listed (e.g., acting as an employee of the limited partnership) that, by themselves, do not
constitute participation in the control of the partnership).
34. Even today, in the process of revising the Uniform Partnership Act, we see repeated pleas
by participants in that project to make the Act conform with limited partnership law, an argument
designed to make the tail wag the dog.
1992]
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